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As of late, there has been a concerted push in the Biden

administration, backed by prominent academics, to expand the
application of antitrust law against major employers who are said to
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and Tamara Skinner of the University of Chicago Law School, for their valuable
research assistance on this paper. This paper has been prepared as part of the
Capitalism and Rule of Law Project organized by the Law and Economics Program of
the Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
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exercise monopsony power that reduces aggregate demand and thus
leaves too many workers on the sidelines. The effort takes place
chiefly in two major areas: stricter attacks on covenants not-tocompete, and more intense review of mergers under the Clayton Act.
This paper begins with an historical account of the law in both
areas, from which it concludes that there is no good reason to alter

the status quo ante. The modern claims of antitrustviolations are said
to rest on the traditional consumer welfare standard. But the
theoretical and empirical evidence behind these claims is thin.
Turnover rates in labor markets are high; labor shortages are now

common; wage growth varies by presidential administration that
changes, and not antitrust law, which has long been constant. Other

labor policies like antidiscrimination laws, paid leave policies, and
minimum wage and overtime laws exert a more direct power.
At present, no systematic evidence suggests the current
(cautious) acceptance of non-compete clauses allows large numbers

of major employers to extract monopsony profits. The only
employers with market power work in markets (like hospitals subject
to certificates of need), where these formal barriers to entry make
these mergers suspect for excessive concentration in product
markets, leaving it utterly unwise to pore over concentration ratios
in thousands of discrete labor markets. Any concern with monopoly
influence in labor markets should seek to weaken the hold of public
and private unions, consistent with the consumer welfare standard.
INTRODUCTION - ANTITRUST IN A STATE OF FLUX

In this paper I shall examine the way in which well-established
antitrust principles should apply to labor markets. In his Executive
Order of July 2021, on Promoting Competition in the Economy,

President Joseph Biden insists that this new inquiry is part of a
comprehensive review of antitrust policy, asking key government
officials to prepare within 180 days a report "on the effects of lack of
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competition in labor markets." 1 In his accompanying fact sheet, he
lays out in simple form the following case:
When there are only a few employers in town, workers have

-

less opportunity to bargain for a higher wage and to demand
dignity and respect in the workplace. In fact, research shows
that industry consolidation is decreasing advertised wages
by as much 17 percent. Tens of millions of Americans
including those working in construction and retail -are
required to sign non-compete agreements as a condition of
getting a job, which makes it harder for them to switch to

better-paying options. 2
As will become clear, both these claims are disputable. The 17

percent decrease in salaries from mergers appears to be a distant
upper bound, not a common occurrence. 3 Most labor markets
operate largely on competitive principles, except in certain key
cases -hospital markets - where Certificate of Need restrictions may
well give major institutions a price advantage in some local markets,

where product market concentration is likely in any event to trigger
antitrust scrutiny. 4 Notwithstanding claims that covenants not-tocompete are widespread and corrosive, 5 the current rule of reason
test in this area, which limits the scope of these covenants, and which

1 THE WHITE HOUSE, Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American
Economy, (July 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/33FU-CXCB].
2 THE WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet: Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the
American Economy, (July 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/328C-389R].
s For the claim, see Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska,
Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data 2, 4-7 (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4LH7DVFV].
4 See discussion infra Part IV.
e Alexander J.S. Colvin & Heidi Shierholz, Noncompete Agreements: Ubiquitous,
Harmful to Wages and to Competition, and Partof a Growing Trend of Employers Requiring
Workers to Sign Away Their Rights, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Dec. 10, 2019)

[https://perma.cc/QL42-W4DX].
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contains exceptions needed to protect both customer good will and
trade secrets again works well.6
The case for major reform is just not there. Nonetheless, the

President's view on the need to expand the reach of antitrust law is
reflected in the remarks of Richard Powers, acting head of the
Antitrust

Division, who

has sought

to reinvigorate

antitrust

enforcement in this field. 7 This broad antitrust initiative is also
defended in Eric Posner's recent book, How Antitrust Failed Workers,8
which is part of an extensive movement by progressive economists
to ramp up the enforcement of the antitrust laws in product and
service markets. At a theoretical level, the argument has been put

forward most visibly by Professor Tim Wu in his book, The Curse of
Bigness, a which is a self-conscious

effort to revive the neo-

Brandeisian view of the economy that sees dangers not just in market
concentration but in the very existence of large firms, even in
competitive markets, who are said to wield disproportionate
influence over our political discourse and activity. In a similar vein,
the now-Chairwoman of the FTC, Lina Khan, wrote an influential
law student note that tackled head-on the practices of Amazon,10 in

an approach that acknowledged that Amazon supplies goods with
superior quality at lower prices, but again questions its undue
influence on the (political) economy. Both Wu and Khan now hold
prominent positions in the Biden Administration -Wu as part of the

6

See discussion infra Part III.

7 "Richard Powers, acting head of the Antitrust Division, said that any effort to hold
down wages is "just as irredeemable as agreements to fix product prices and allocate
markets, conduct that the division has prosecuted for over 100 years." Diane Bartz,
U.S. Antitrust Official Says Competition in Labor Markets a Top Concern,REUTERS (October

1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/FRQ3-565B]
$ ERIC A. POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021)
9 TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018). I have
been deeply critical of this effort. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, 'The Curse ofBigness' Review:

Revisiting the Gilded Age, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H242-DMAC];
Richard A. Epstein, The Old Brandeis and the New Madison in Historical Perspective,
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L (July 27, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LSV2-XB62].
10 Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2016).
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National Economic Council on technology and competition policy,11
and Khan as the head of the Federal Trade Commission. 12
They, along with other prominent scholars, have launched two-

pronged attack on the antitrust status quo. The first prong insists that
the application of antimonopoly principles has been deficient in the
oversight of various business transactions, most notably in the area
of mergers - including a claim that the state ought to block mergers

by large firms with "nascent competitors," in order to facilitate the
independent growth of new powerhouse firms to offset the
dominance of a few major tech companies. 13 That viewpoint is now
echoed in the legislative arena, as there are multiple bills, including
one by Senator Amy Klobuchar, 14 that seek to reduce the burdens the

government has to satisfy either to block planned mergers or even
undo mergers that have already taken place.
Posner's claim that antitrust has failed all-or is it only some?workers is the culmination of his collaborative scholarly output in
this area. He has previously authored two articles that advance the
same claim. The first is co-authored with Suresh Naidu, and Glen
Weyl (NPW), with the somewhat neutral title, Antitrust Remedies for
Labor Market Power.15 Two years later, Ioana Marinescu and Posner
raised the ante in their article, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed
Workers?,16 which treats the substantive conclusion as a given, and
then relies on multiple exhaustive empirical studies that "document
statistically the pervasiveness of labor monopsony in the United

ut Lauren Feiner, Big Tech Critic Tim Wu Joins Biden Administration to Work on
Competition Policy, CNBC (Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GS4W-Y3PY].
12 Lina M.
Khan, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (last visited Feb. 1, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/6SBY-JEX7].
13 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1879

(2020).

14 Richard

A. Epstein, Klobuchar's Antitrust Blunder, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 8, 2021)

[https://perma.cc/9CWL-33WZ].
15 Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market

Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018).
16 Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?,105 CORN.
L. REV. 1343 (2020).
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States." 17 The term "labor monopsony" is instructive because it

indicates that these attacks are made within the confines of the
traditional "consumer welfare" model, to beat, as it were, the

antitrust skeptics in labor markets at their own game by showing
high concentration in many key labor markets. It, thus, accepts the

dominance of competitive markets by insisting time and again that
current merger review under the antitrust laws fail to take into
account the negative impact of mergers on labor markets.18 In so
doing, they do not rely on the earlier expansive Warren Court
treatment of antitrust law, which cast a negative view of mergers
between minor firms that had little overall impact on general market
behavior. 19 In exploring this new frontier, the modern critics rightly
concentrate on large-scale horizontal transactions. These standard

market division and price fixing arrangements have little efficiency
benefit and are thus in general subject to a rule of per se illegality,
which erects a powerful presumption that restraints will be treated
as illegal, unless some exceptional circumstance requires otherwise.20

17 Id. at 1345 n.10 (containing the following list: Jose Azar,
Ioana Marinescu,
Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska, Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from
Online Vacancy Data 2, 4-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395,

2018) [https://perma.cc/ 4LH7-DVFV]; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and
Weak Employees: How Does Employer ConcentrationAffect Wages? 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24307, 2018) [https://perma.cc/DN2P-CMGJ];
Brad Hershbein, Claudia Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S. Local Labor
Markets: Evidence from Vacancy and Employment Data 2 (Mar. 15, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) [https://perma.cc/7JL7-PE3L]; Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, Labor-Market
Concentration and Labor Compensation 4 (Jan. 7, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)

[https://perma.cc/QZ3J-FKCL]).

18 See

POSNER, supra note 8, at 7; Marinescu & Posner, supra note 16, at 1391.

19 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.

Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966): Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967). For the reaction to this line of cases see, for example, Robert H. Bork & Ward
Bowman, The Crisisin Anti trust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965) (reprinted from an earlier
article in Fortune with the same title). The article was part of a dialogue with two
Columbia Law School Professors. See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense
of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965). The entire debate is well worth reading
today but, for reasons of space, cannot be dealt with here.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975) (allowing
correspondent bank cooperation to be judged under a rule of reason test).
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In contrast, horizontal mergers have both restrictive losses and
21

efficiency gains,

so that a rule of reason is commonly used to sort

out these transactions, as first articulated by then-Judge William

Howard Taft in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,22 which
blessed mergers with some "ancillary" benefit-which he did not

find in the horizontal division of markets in that case. 23
Both traditional scholars and the new progressive critics
typically rely on the common, if imperfect, method to measure the
concentration losses, using the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which measures the change in concentration by looking

at the square of the fraction of the market controlled by the dominant
(usually) top five firms. 24 As an initial caveat, the HHI often
overstates the level of market concentration because it ignores the

prospect of new entry into a given market, whether driven by
technological innovation or changes in the market or regulatory
environment. But, the formula is still an instructive starting point for
analysis. In the most extreme case, where a single firm has the entire
market, the number is 10,000, or 100 x 100. With two firms of equal

strength, that number drops rapidly to 2(50x50) or 5,000-a drop of
50 percent. That numerical exercise tends to lead to a judgment that
an HHI of over 2,500 presents some serious dangers. That result is
broadly consistent with the standard Cournot duopoly model, which

predicts the noncooperative behavior between two firms yields both
smaller reduction in outputs and smaller increases in price than hold

21

Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.

ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
22
23

175 U.S. 211 (1899).
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) ("No

conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the
covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect
him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.").
24 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., The Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex (July 31, 2018)

[https://perma.cc/Z2KM-66JG].
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when there is but a single player in the market.25 Each additional
entrant produces a further movement to the competitive level, such
that with three equal firms the index is 3(33.333)2 ~ 3,333. Hence, in
all markets the rapid decline in market power starts with two firms,
which means that as the costs of prosecution rise as the benefits

decline, which reduces the net benefit of antitrust enforcement that
is likely to matter most in small labor markets, like the small towns
and rural communities to which Posner and others refer, on the
artificial assumptions that these areas are typically served by one or

at most two firms. 26 Accordingly, much of the difficulty here comes
with purported benefits of restrictions in labor markets, most notably
in the form of covenants not-to-compete, which generally have been

subjected to a rule of reason analysis.
The picture here is further complicated because the labor side of
the market often is not competitive. Today, workers are
allowed through unionization to cartelize their labor, which they
often do as with unionized nurses in rural communities, and with

teachers, prison guards, police and firefighters. Teachers' unions
mount ferocious opposition to new entry in the form of charter
schools or vouchers, and prison guards, police and fire fighters do
not have to fear entry. The position of airline pilots is likewise strong
because stringent licensing requirements make it exceedingly
difficult for any airline to hire replacement workers during a strike.
A complete account of this matter therefore requires some look at
how the antitrust law was pressed into service by employers against
unions until the New Deal era, and in some cases beyond.

In order to link these diverse threads together, Part I of this paper
begins with a survey of these early developments and concludes that

25

For

a

discussion,

ECONOMICSDISCUSSION.NET

see Cournot's Duopoly Model (with Diagram),
(last visited Jan. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/GZL7-

LYHV].
26 As in Posner in dealing with specialist labor markets for servicing pumping

equipment in small towns, POSNER, supra note 8, at 3, and with nurses and a single
rural hospital, id. at 103.
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the arguments against unionization that were often made, with

varying success, during the nineteenth century, remain potent today.
At the outset the antitrust law was applied to common law suits

brought by employers against unions, but very few to unions against
employers, which the two major statutory landmarks were the
Clayton Act of 1914 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
Part II traces the antitrust law as it applies to labor from its origins in

1711 to the end of the Second World War. In Part III, I look at some
of the various regulatory forces that shape labor markets in profound
ways, and claim that in many instances these forces are far more
important to the operation of labor law than the antitrust laws could

ever be. The ebbs and flow of these various schemes is quite
profound, and I look to a comparison between labor policies in the
Obama and Trump administrations to emphasize those differences.
In Part IV, I offer theoretical reasons why the monopsony model does
not give an accurate account of most labor markets.
Thereafter, I apply this general approach to the contemporary
scene. The modern movement to stricter antitrust enforcement
started gently in the Obama Administration, grew during a populist
Trump era,27 and is now growing with increasing fury in the Biden
administration. At this time, it became increasingly common to
charge that many (but by no means all) labor markets are

characterized by heavy monopsony powers that can be measured by
same techniques that are used to deal with product markets. To
evaluate this claim, one must first identify the explicit contractual

provisions (going back to Mitchel v. Reynolds 28 ) that operate in
restraint of trade, and thus are subject, at low administrative cost no
less, to invalidation on facial grounds without the need for laborintensive inquiries of the sort that are routine in connection with
Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) reviews of mergers today. The second

potential application of the antitrust laws to employment markets is

27 See, e.g., Steven Overly & Josh Gerstein, Trump AdministrationSues to Block AT&TTime Warner Merger, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X2NH-UG2N].
28 (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (QB).
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resource-intensive because it tries to break with what has been a

uniform practice until this present day of never seeking to challenge
a merger on the ground that it leads to undue level of concentration

in certain geographical and occupational markets that can be studied
and reviewed in the same way as mergers are today.
In my view, this two-pronged attack on employment
markets deserves a split verdict. The facial attacks on particular
clauses on labor matters may in some cases bear fruit and in some
not. Many arguments against these transactions have the common

feature of ignoring the efficiency justifications that would matter
under a rule of reason approach. The effort to use per se rules in this
area is as much a mistake today as it was in Mitchel over 300 years

ago. As for the effort to apply HSR to labor markets in mergers, it
might succeed in some few cases, but in most cases the game will not
be worth the candle. Localized markets are too small. Other powerful
regulatory schemes protect some but not all workers; rich subsidy
programs often dim the willingness to work so that many high-paid

jobs go begging, in part because of COVID; 29 complex market
structures using independent contractors; the prospect of new entry
(especially as geographical limits are in some instance breaking

down) make any straightforward analysis of market difficult to
achieve; and a widely perceived labor shortage has encouraged
unions to flex their bargaining power by staging strikes that could
easily interfere with market production, especially as it is widely
acknowledged that fragile supply changes in both the national and
global economy pose a serious threat to the economic order. 0

29 See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Breaking Down the Big US labor Shortage: Crunch Could
Partly Ease This Fall but Much of It Could Take Years to Fix, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/ 7WLV-QPZB].
30 See, e.g., Bob Tita, Deere Workers Go On Strike for First Time in 35 Years, THE WALL
ST. J. (October 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HL94-RVLP].
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I. THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LAW IN LABOR
MARKETS

The early case of Mitchel v. Reynolds arose out of a dispute
between two bakers. Mitchel had taken a lease of the premises owned
by Reynolds, who had previously operated a bakeshop at that
location. Reynolds had given Mitchel a bond for £50 that could be
enforced if Reynolds were to open a rival bakeshop in the same
neighborhood within five years, which he did. When Mitchel sued

on the bond, Reynolds defended on the ground that the contract was
unenforceable as a contract in restraint of trade because it prevented
Reynolds from plying his trade as a baker, with this famous passage:
that wherever a sufficient consideration appears to make it a
proper and an useful contract, and such as cannot be set
aside without injury to a fair contractor, it ought to be
maintained; but with this constant diversity, viz. where the
restraint is general not to exercise a trade throughout the

kingdom, and where it is limited to a particular place; for the
former of these must be void, being of no benefit to either
party, and only oppressive, as shall be shown by and by.31
Mitchel reads like a modern rule of reason case, even if its logic
does get a bit fuzzy. The opinion offers no definition of what counts
as a fair trader, for the explanation offered is not quite equal to the
challenge. The general restraints are far too broad, but if they benefit
neither party, why would anyone enter into them? Or stated
otherwise, if the restriction were to apply to places where Reynolds
did not do business, why would he insist on a lose/lose contract,
when Mitchel moving to another town would only reduce the
number of potential local competitors by one? Does this transaction

protect the fair contractor? Initially, this case does not impose
restraints on the activities of a former employee, where it is possible

31 Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (QB).
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to identify strong trade-offs. The former employee may well have
learned trade secrets on the job or gained acquaintance with
customers whom he could solicit thereafter. The tradeoff is therefore
that the removal of all restraints on ex post conduct would reduce the

likelihood that a fellow entrepreneur or prospective employee would
be offered a position in the first place. In these cases, it is quite
possible that a strong restrictive covenant would work to the mutual

benefit of the parties, if the consideration given to the employee were
large enough to compensate for his lost opportunities.
That point, however, is not sufficient to ensure that none of these
contracts acts in restraint of trade. One competitor may offer a large
sum to keep a competitor out of the market, and even though that
contract is for the mutual gain between the parties, it imposes
negative effects on third parties, so that a rule of reason analysis has
to apply, which is exactly what happens today in the patent dispute
settlements where a challenger is given a payment to stay out of the

market for a given period. 32 Mitchel offers no analysis of why the
restriction had to be this long, given that the usual employer interests
are not (obviously) presented in the case, and my guess is that the

same fact pattern today would either void the covenant, or reduce its
duration. But in other cases of this sort, the law tends to disfavor
these agreements. 33 Typically, the key variables tend to be three. The

32 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.136 (2013), where straight cash payments looked
like a division of the market, but payments in which the duration of the patent
protection varies with the strength of the patentee position precisely because there is

no cash division. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811
(N.D. Ill. 2020) (upholding such payments); see also FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327
(3d Cir. 2020).
See, for example, Omniplex World Services Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Services, Inc.,
which explained the reasoning as follows:
A non-competition agreement between an employer and an employee will
be enforced if the contract is narrowly drawn to protect the employer's
legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee's
ability to earn a living, and is not against public policy. Because such
restrictive covenants are disfavored restraints on trade, the employer bears
the burden of proof and any ambiguities in the contract will be construed in
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first is duration, and in this context, five years turns out to be a long
time, given that the norm with employment contracts is usually one
year, unless some special circumstances apply. Next, there is the
question of product line, which here favors Mitchel, since the case

does not involve new product lines that were not prepared or
marketed by Reynolds. Last, there is the question of geographical
extension, which again favors Mitchel, because it looks as though the
two shops were close enough together that the customers could as
easily access the one as the other. There is a great advantage in

having, at least in employment contracts, workable presumptions for
routine cases, where these covenants are commonly demanded, not
through collusion among employers, but by independent parties
each making its own business decision.
In dealing with covenants of this sort, it is important to note
that they are not sprawling affairs. The remedy in Mitchel was a
liquidated damage clause, which can be enforced without much ado.
There is no need to define the relevant market because it can be
assumed that the two parties are the only relevant persons in the
trade, so deals structured as in Mitchel place no real strain on the

institutional capabilities of the court. 4
The next major case, the Philadelphia Cordwainers Case
(Commonwealth v. Pullis), involved a criminal indictment against the

favor of the employee. Each non-competition agreement must be evaluated
on its own merits, balancing the provisions of the contract with the
circumstances of the businesses and employees involved. Whether the
covenant not to compete is enforceable is a question of law which we
review de novo.

618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005) (internal citations removed).
s The same is true, incidentally, in connection with the first rate regulation case,

Allnutt v. Inglis, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (KB), where it was held that a tax-exempt
customs house could not charge more than the regular market rate for similar services
in the nearby market-a price differential that is easily calculated. Allnut was of
exceptional importance because its use of the elusive phrase "virtual monopoly" was
carried over into American law in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). For a general
discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD, 279-87, 29-38 (1998).
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cordwainers, who were craftsman who made new shoes out of new
leather. These men sought to cartelize the local market by setting up
minimum rates for work among members, which were set higher

than the traditional fees. 35 Recorder Levy drew the modern
distinction between independent decisions individually made,
which are the hallmark of a competitive market, and collective

decisions that are "bound down by ... agreement" between parties
"and pledged by mutual engagements," 3 6 solely for their mutual
advantage, i.e., without religious or charitable motivations.
Politically, the cordwainers never marched under a cartelization
banner, but claimed democratic legitimacy for their collective
actions.37 Unfortunately, that argument proves too much, for all

individual transactions in cartel-like conditions are for the mutual
advantage of both sides, 38 so that if this privilege were granted in
product markets, the entire category of contracts in restraint of trade
would become empty. The antitrust law, therefore, can never accept
the mutual gains to the contracting parties as a justification for cartel

pricing above competitive levels.
Nonetheless, at the end of the day, PhiladelphiaCordwainerswas
a solid victory for the cartel, whose members were fined $8.00 each

plus cost, a comparative slap on the wrist. Nor did the Court issue
any injunction against the continuation of the cartel practices, which

is standard fare with business cartels. The perceived difference
between business and labor cartels is not hard to detect. By the next
major criminal prosecution in 1840 in Commonwealth v. Hunt,39 Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw concluded that labor cartels were made for
"useful and honorable purposes," only to end with this rousing cheer

because "we cannot perceive, that it is criminal for men to agree
together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner

3 See Walter Nelles, The FirstAmerican Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931).
36

Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (Phil. Mayor's Ct. 1806).

37 Nelles, supra note 35.
38 See Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 160 (1857).
39

45 Mass. 111 (1842).
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as best to subserve their own interests." 40 But even Shaw thought that
there were limits to the exercise of that power, when he wrote that

criminal prosecutions would be permissible in dangerous hold out
situations, where workers in unison agree to breach their contracts

for partisan advantage. Thus:
If a large number of men, engaged for a certain time, should
combine together to violate their contract, and quit their

employment together, it would present a very different
question. Suppose a farmer, employing a large number of
men, engaged for the year, at fair monthly wages, and
suppose that just at the moment that his crops were ready to
harvest, they should all combine to quit his service, unless he
would advance their wages, at a time when other laborers

could not be obtained. It would surely be a conspiracy to do
an unlawful act, though of such a character, that if done by

an individual, it would lay the foundation of a civil action
only, and not of a criminal prosecution. It would be a case
very different from that stated in this count.4 1
This passage explicitly knocked out criminal action against labor
cartels. In practice, it necessarily knocked out any civil action against
the members of the organization as well, so that the only
consequence in case of labor contracts was that the agreement was

regarded as "void," and, thus, not legally enforceable by the parties
to it,42 which meant that the arrangement was subject to a systematic

risk of decay, albeit it at an uncertain rate.

40
41

Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 131.

42 See, for example, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. finding that the
territorial division in that case was illegal because it was not "ancillary" to some
legitimate purpose:
Contracts that were unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not
unlawful in the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for
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In the aftermath of the aforementioned key judicial decisions,
legislative action was taken both in England, with the Trade Disputes
Act of 1906,43 and the United States, with the passage of the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act. The English statute contained three key

provisions. By the first, it refused to allow for the enforcement of any
labor contract, on the dubious assumption that there was no
intention to create legal relations. By the second, it held that actions

legal if done by one person were legal if done by many in concert.
Hence, that provision overrode the critical distinction articulated in

the Cordwainers Case and protected actions like secondary boycotts
directed against third parties. By its third key provision, the statute
refused to allow actions for the inducement of breach of contract, a
tort that had its origins in England in the famous case of Lumley v.
Gye. 44 In that case, one opera impresario was allowed to sue his rival
who had induced his lead singer, the great Johanna Wagner, to

abandon her contracts for performances at Queen's Theatre in order
to perform at Covent Garden.
It is important to understand the powerful destabilization of
labor relations that was wrought by this statute, which led to a

consistent decline in the performance of labor markets until the entire
issue came to head in the early days of Margaret Thatcher's rise as
Prime Minister. The want of any enforceable labor contracts under

the first key provision made employers vulnerable to constant
wildcat strikes and worse-which could not happen under the
American National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), under which the

Supreme Court held that injunctive relief could be granted to
employers against a union's breach of a labor contract. 45 The NLRA

system remains far inferior to a competitive solution because it

damages in favor of one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply
void, and were not enforced by the court.

85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898).
4s 6 Edw. 7 c. 47.
44 Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (QB).
4s Boy's Market v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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creates enormous rigidities when it comes to re-contracting. But, its
overregulated regime was less vulnerable to catastrophic failure than
the English system. 46
The Trade Disputes Act legalized a collective refusal to deal,
which imported enormous leverage over firms. The contrast to the
position within the antitrust laws, where such conduct is per se
illegal, should be clear. And, the differences are even greater because

of the power that unions have to engage in picketing, which can, of
course, in some contexts generate threats to use force. 47
The third element on inducement of breach of contract played a
very large role in labor disputes. Recall that in Lumley v. Gye and its

sister case of Lumley v. Wagner,48 the disappointed impresario could
not make Miss Wagner sign for his company, but it could enjoin her
from singing for a rival.49 It is, therefore, fair to ask what additional
gain comes from allowing a second injunction that is largely

duplicative of the first. But, the situation changes in labor disputes
when the multiple parties in breach are individual workers who go
out on strike at the last moment -the situation that Chief Justice
Shaw viewed as giving rise to tort liability. Shaw's views on the tort

of inducement of breach contract came to a head in the 1917 case
Hitchman Coal and Coke Co v. Mitchell,50 where after considerable

periods of labor unrest a group of workers came to Hitchman Coal
and offered to work, while agreeing not to join any union so long as

46

One notable illustration of the business breakdown under the NLRB was the

"strike wave" at the end of World War II when the provisions of the War Labor Act
were no longer in effect and unions could hold out for substantial wage increases. Both
the Labor-Management Act of 1947, commonly known as Taft-Hartley Act, and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Landrum-Griffin Act,
were passed by a Republican Congress that sought to limit union power under the
earlier regime.
47 See Vegalahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896), for a heated historical
dispute over the picketing issue.
48

49

(1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687.
Id.; see also Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. 749.

so 245 U.S. 229 (1917). For my long defense of Justice Pitney's majority opinion, see
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L. J. 1357,1370-75 (1983).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

344

New York UniversityJournal of Law & Liberty

[Vol.15:327

they were paid union wages. The deal worked for both sides because
it cut out the costs of dealing with a middleman (which would today

be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA) and improved labor
stability. But when these workers quit the job, the only viable action

was not against these multitude of workers, but after the union that
induced them all to walk off in unison in violation of their contract,
which Pitney allowed, provoking thereby a huge row to end the use
of the labor injunction. 1
It is worth noting that these post-employment restrictions should

be subject to a rule of reason analysis as a restraint of trade. That
analysis might have had some traction if the employer sought to

restrict membership in a union for, say, one year after an employee's
contract of employment had ended. But for Hitchman, the deal made
sense when limited to the period of employment where it could
reduce the odds that the workers would go out on strike after the coal
had been removed from the seams, but not taken to the surface.
Given the strictures that Shaw put on the potential of the practice, the
reasonableness of the constraint would be sure to be upheld at
common law.
The same issues of employment contracts that led to the passage
of the English Trade Disputes Act exerted a similar force in the
United States. The Court's initial foray into labor relations came in
the explosive decision in Loewe v. Lawlor.s2 There, a unanimous
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, held that a

secondary boycott of hat makers in Danbury, Connecticut was an
activity that involved interstate commerce (even before the
expansive view of the commerce clause that marked the New Deal

revolution) because of the movement of goods from their places of
manufacture to distributors and consumers throughout the United

51

See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHANIEL GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)

(helping secure the passage of the Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932, which limited the
circumstances in which federal courts could issue those injunctions).
52 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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States. Holmes then addressed the issue of legislative intent, and
concluded that it supported the textual language:
I think the Congressional debates show that the statute had
its origin in the evils of massed capital; but, when the
Congress came to formulating the prohibition, which is the

yardstick for measuring the complainant's right to the
injunction, it expressed it in these words: 'Every contract or
combination in the form of trust, or otherwise in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.' The subject had so
broadened in the minds of the legislators that the source of
the evil was not regarded as material, and the evil in its
entirety is dealt with. They made the interdiction include
combinations of labor as well as of capital; in fact, all

combinations in restraint of commerce, without reference to
the character of the persons who entered into them.53
It should be noted that this lawsuit was for the secondary

boycott, not for insisting on negotiating a collective agreement with
the employer. But, the language was susceptible of covering both

arrangements and, thus, of undermining the accommodation that
had taken hold since Commonwealth v. Hunt. Whatever its original

-

reach, Loewe quickly gave rise to political pressure to limit its scope

a matter that took great prominence in the 1912 election, where Taft
lost to Wilson, when the progressive Teddy Roosevelt ran on a third-

party ticket. At this point, the passage of the Clayton Act made
official the split policy between labor and firm activity. On the firm
side, Section 7 of the Clayton Act expanded the federal control over
mergers by declaring that stock and, after amendment in 1950, asset
transactions should be limited where "the effect of such acquisition
may be

3

substantially

to

lessen

competition,

or to

Id. at 301-02.
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concern with this provision-that

remains with us today -is how far back can one look if the statutory
prohibition kicks in with respect to acquisitions that may
substantially lessen competition. In any event, the provision leaves

much in the hand of key government officials to sort out.
The combined effect of Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act
makes it clear that different standards apply in labor cases. Section 6
reads:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall

be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the

purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal

combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.55
That section was in turn complemented by Section 20, which

limited the power of the federal government to issue injunctions in
any labor dispute "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property, or to a property right, of the party making the application,
for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law."5 6 In the end,
the major effect of these provisions was to allow workers to form
unions but not to engage in the secondary boycotts that were ruled
illegal in Loewe. Thus, no less a figure than William Howard Taft

5415 U.S.C. § 18.

ss Id. @ 17. Note the phrase here has been picked up elsewhere. See INT'L LABOUR
ORG., International Labour Organization Declaration of Philadelphia (1944)
[https://perma.cc/3N45-PEFR] (opening with its endorsement of the fundamental
principle that "labour is not a commodity" without saying what labor is).
56

29 U.S.C § 52.
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insisted, after he lost the Presidency, that the Clayton Act provisions
had "slight practical importance." 5 7 But, that soothing reading leaves
unexplained the huge political battle over Section 6. I think that the
best explanation was that labor backers wanted Section 6 to forestall
the possibility that Loewe might be read to make all collective actions
of unions, like collective actions of business cartels illegal where no

unfair labor practices exist. Indeed, in 1907, prior to the decision in
Loewe, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County took
58 In that
exactly that position in the leading case of Kealey v. Faulkner.

case, a dispute between two factions of the Amalgamed Window
Glass Workers of America, the court had ordered that the union be

dissolved.
The harder question was whether Section 6 and Section 20 also

overturned Loewe v. Lawlor by granting unions freedom to engage in
secondary boycotts. A divided Supreme Court resolved the question
in Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering59 in a strong opinion by Justice
Mahlon Pitney, in which the broad dissent of Justice Brandeis
reverted to a familiar theme by claiming that union self-interest

meant that the union activity was protected because it was done "not
maliciously, but in self-defense," which necessarily erodes the line
between collective bargaining and secondary boycotts. 60 At this
point, it is worth noting, as Professor Daniel Ernst documents, that

the key opposition to Section 6 was the American Anti-Boycott
Association (AABA), whose Daniel Davenport had resisted union
boycotts, but not collective bargaining as such.61 His interpretation
was backed by none other than William Howard Taft in the years

57

See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT

(1914), written when Taft was no longer president.

58 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 49 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1907).
59 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
60 Id. at 480-81.
61 See Daniel Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908-1914, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1151, 1165
(1989).
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between his presidency and his service on the Supreme Court, when
he voted with Pitney's majority in Duplex.62 Ernst concluded
the AFL gambled that it could win from the courts what it
could not from the Congress. If the labor leaders' gamble lost
in the Supreme Court (by only a two-vote margin in Deering),
it was a gamble in which, given the political alignments of
the day, they had little to lose and much to gain.63
In a parallel development, the United States Supreme Court held,
correctly in my view, 64 that the constitutional protection of liberty of
contract meant that neither the federal government nor the states
could compel an employer to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement against its will.65 Hence, although much union organizing

was exempt from the antitrust laws, unions had no way to force an
employer to come to the bargaining table. Unions during that period
could continue to engage in various activities outside the courts to
impose their will on companies, but these activities were of uncertain
effect altogether. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act picked up where

Section 20 of the Clayton Act left off, by restricting the power of
federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 66 In 1937, in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,67 the Supreme Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act after it had been struck down by three
separate circuit courts68 and imposed on an employer an affirmative

62 Id. at 1165-66. Taft was no antitrust slouch and between his presidency and his
appointment as Chief Justice to the Supreme Court, he turned author. See WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914).
63 Ernst, supra note 61, at 1167.
64 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 48-51

(2006).
65 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal system for railroads, per

Harlan,

J.); Coppage

v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state regulations, per Pitney,

J.)

Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 90 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. @@ 101-15).
67 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
68 See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 49
(1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd,
66
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duty to bargain in good faith with the exclusive bargaining agent
chosen by a union election. No longer could a firm that was unhappy

with union demands seek to do business with its workers directly or
with third parties. Later, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)

allowed the government to adopt minimum wage and overtime
regulation. 69 The long-term aspirations of the labor movement that
were unattainable in 1914 were enacted into law during the New
Deal.

There is no way to justify these complex rules as principled
deviations from a competitive policy. 0 In theory, the commitment of
the new generation of antitrust theorists to apply the general

consumer welfare standard to both management and labor should
lead them to seek to undo all of these arrangements on the ground

that they impose entry barriers and other restrictions in restraint of
trade. 1 But in practice, their commitment is more to workers as a
class than it is to the ideal of a competitive market. Nothing about

competitive markets, for example, explains why workers should
receive time-and-a-half for any hour over forty hours per week. Yet,
Posner at no point discusses the deeply anticompetitive features of
this act, which deeply distort labor markets while posing major

administrative problems.7 2 Nor do Posner and his coauthors take any
firm stand against the organization and protection of labor unions,

301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936),
rev'd, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The circuit opinions were reprinted in full in Justice James
Clark McReynolds's dissent to all three of these cases in NLRB v. Friedman-HarryMarks

Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 79-84 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
69 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
70 For my historical study of the same, see Richard A. Epstein, The Regulatory Hour:
The History, Law and Economics of Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Legislation, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 477 (2019).
71 See Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 539 ("In this paper we outline how
antitrust doctrine and regulatory analysis can be modified to account for labor market
power. We argue there is no economic or legal basis for the omission of labor market
considerations from antitrust scrutiny, and we provide labor market analogues of the
existing standards used by regulators to scrutinize product market mergers."). The
authors go on to reference the HHI.
72 See Epstein, supra note 70, at 503-19 (2019).
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which do have a strong measure of monopoly power that has

resulted in oft-document wage premiums and job benefits. 73
Unions sought and finally obtained-with the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 -formal legal recognition by the
government and the right to strike and bargain collectively.

Labor organization offered an alternative to antitrust law:
rather than break apart employers into competitive buyers
of labor, unions bring together workers so that their

aggregated bargaining power could counter the bargaining
power of the large employer.74
Yet, if their bedrock position is anti-monopoly, then they should

applaud the decline in union power on the grounds that competitive
markets are distorted by union activity. They neither do so, nor do
they note the shortfall in the unionization strategy. The first best

solution is to break up any management monopoly in order to return
to a competitive situation. The NLRA solution, however, goes
overboard in at least two critical ways. First, it assumes that all the
employers who are subject to the Act have some degree of monopoly
power, which is a wild over-exaggeration in an industry where even
small firms and small bargaining units within larger firms are subject
to these statutory duties.75 Second, even for firms thought to possess

that kind of power, unions exacerbate the situation by creating a
second level of monopoly power that often clashes with the first,
thereby increasing the likelihood of strikes and other activities with

negative third-party effects. The defense of labor here seems to rest
more on distributional grounds that workers as a class are entitled to

7s See RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 6 (1984) ("Most,
if not all, unions have monopoly power, which they can use to raise wages above
competitive levels.").
74 POSNER, supra note 8, at 13.
75 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Gissel

Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (an epic organizational

fight over a bargaining unit with 49 employees, involving the discharge of two

employees); see also N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (1st Cir. 1968).
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a larger share of the economic pie. But, even that rationale is strained,

given that advances for union workers shrink the total number of
jobs available, and, thus, reduce the welfare of those workers

excluded from the industry. None of this is a surprise in the current
political climate, where "good union jobs" are the coin of the realm.
But as becomes clear in the next section, this attitude leads to
overregulation of labor markets, which will only be made worse by

the aggressive and novel application of antitrust law to workers. But,
what is wholly missing in Posner and others in his camp is their call
for the repeal of the NLRA (and of course the FLSA), not any half-

hearted endorsement of the statute.
II. THE

MODERN CASE FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

In dealing with the modern assertions about the dominance of
antitrust law, it is important to note the initial intellectual move that
clouds the entire enterprise. Thus, in his book, Posner starts in this

fashion:
In the United States, and much of the Western world,
economic growth has slowed, inequality has risen, and

wages have stagnated. Academic research has identified
several possible causes, ranging from major structural shifts
in the economy to public policy failure. One cause that has

received increasing attention from economists is labor
market power, the ability of employers to set wages below
workers' marginal revenue product. New evidence suggests
that many labor markets around the country are not

competitive but instead exhibit considerable market power
enjoyed by employers, who use their market power to
suppress wages.76

76 POSNER, supra note 8, at 1. A similar passage is found in Naidu, Posner & Weyl,
supra note 15, at 537.
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The first sentence makes a striking claim that declining economic
growth rates and rising inequality are givens and then immediately
turns to the claim that "one cause" of both of these retrograde claims
is the abuse of monopsony power -without mentioning what other
causes there might be and how the full set of causes works together.

It is agreed upon by all parties that antitrust law has paid no attention
to labor markets in evaluating mergers under federal law. Indeed,
the antitrust inquiries into labor law are confined to cases of overt
cartelization but have never, to the theorists' knowledge (or mine),

been used to challenge any merger on the grounds of anticompetitive
effects on labor markets.77 So, a uniform practice of that sort cannot
explain the many variations observed in growth rates or income
inequality. At this point, there are two notable issues. The first is the

want of documentation of either the declining economic growth rate
or rising inequality. There are no identifiable time periods for which
these claims are asserted, and there is no mention of the possibility
that both economic growth and inequality may exhibit cyclical

properties that require two or more causes to explain the movements
in both directions.
Indeed, a cursory review of some of the salient facts
demonstrates that they are inconsistent with the monopsony model.
To show how these other factors matter, I shall content myself with
some limited observations about the contrast of policies between the
Obama years and the Trump years, stopping the analysis of the latter
as of March 2020, before the halting responses to COVID-19
swamped everything else. I realize that this comparison is in many
ways flawed because Trump himself was no classical liberal. He

believed in economic protectionism and refused to join the TransPacific Partnership

-points

on which there was much bipartisan

support, given that organized labor took exactly the same position. It
is therefore clear that any overall comparison of the Obama-Trump

performance does not offer a sharp contrast on all relevant issues,

77 Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 571.
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such that we should expect the record to be somewhat muddied - as
it in fact is.78 But notwithstanding the many similarities, there are key

differences that are especially relevant to any question of overall
economic growth and the performance of labor markets. Under the
classical liberal position, one key determinant of economic growth as

the extent to which competitive markets are allowed to operate free
from heavy government regulation, including over-enforcement of
the antitrust laws. At the end of the day, the confident judgment is
that Trump's more deregulatory stance had to be preferable to
Obama's more interventionist mode. All the familiar cautionary

notes apply because political transitions do not operate like on-off
switches. But even so, there was a powerful change in course which

prompted this bold prediction from Paul Krugman, made just after
the 2016 election, which in retrospect looks weirdly out of date:
"Now comes the mother of all adverse effects -and what it brings
with it is a regime that will be ignorant of economic policy and hostile

to any effort to make it work," Krugman wrote. "So we are very
probably looking at a global recession, with no end in sight. I suppose
we could get lucky somehow. But on economics, as on everything
else, a terrible thing has just happened." 79 And that terrible thing was
on some domestic issues a halting revival of laissez-faire economics.
Now look at some of the general numbers that belie any

claim of a declining growth rate and rising inequality. Stock growth
during the 807 trading days before Trump's election victory in
November 2016 was 31% versus a 56% increase in the 807 after the
election-off a higher base. 80 Next comes matters of distributional

concerns. Does any form of market liberalization create a greater
concentration of wealth? One rough measure of that concentration is

7$ See, e.g., Heather Long, The Trump vs. Obama Economy
WASHINGTON PosT (Aug. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FBN4-LHP4]

-

in 15 Charts,
(noting that the

data shows "a mixed picture" on the relevant comparisons).
79 Paul Krugman, What Happened on Election Day, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016)

[https://perma.cc/4NXE-4L9Q].

80 Maxim Lott, The Trump Economy, Three Years In: What the Numbers Say, YAHoo
FIN. (Jan. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/563T-6CA5].
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the Gini coefficient, which can range from zero to one-where the

former number means a perfect equality of wealth (that never
happens) and one means that all the wealth is in the hands of one
individual (which never happens either). The overall progression
starts at around 0.43 in 1990, jumps to about 0.46 at the end of the
Clinton administration, where it levels during Bush 43, until it picks
up to about 0.48 during the Obama years where it again levels off
under Trump. I think that very little should be made of the more

rapid growth in Democratic years, but it is a cautionary tale of the
unintended consequences of strongly redistributive policies. It is
important, moreover, not to put too much weight on this index,
which only measures wealth differences, and not wealth aggregates.
It is always possible to reduce the Gini coefficient by having more

rapid declines in wealth for rich people than for poor ones. So, an
improvement in the Gini coefficient is consistent with a Paretoinferior situation, in which everyone is made worse off by
government policies. A look at the overall income figures avoids that

peril, and here the numbers indicate ups and downs, with the most
rapid ups in 2018 (when the Gini coefficient ticked upward) in the
aftermath of the Trump tax cuts. You can draw your own inferences
on causation. In my view, the Trump corporate tax cuts freed up

-

more capital for investment, which in turn drove up real wages - all
without the slightest influence of antitrust law in labor markets.
It is of course possible to protest that these averages conceal a
greater rise at the top than at the bottom, where the argument is that
the greater share of the wealth accrues to the top 1% of the
population, which has surely increased over the past three decades
although there is a disagreement as to how much.81 But, the difficulty

81

For contrasting views, see Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality

in the United States Since 1913: Evidencefrom CapitalizedIncome Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON.
519 (2016), claiming that the share of income held by the top 1% has soared from 24%
of the total share in 1980 to 42% today, a figure criticized as being overstated by a factor
of two in Phillip Magness, New Evidence that Soaring Inequality Is a Myth, AM. INST.

ECON. RES. (June 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2MTK-FZGD].
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for these purposes is that top 1% covers a huge range of income, from
$538,926, hardly a munificent sum in New York City or San
Francisco, to billions of dollars at the very top. Much of the income

at the bottom level of this top 1% range is earned income in a wide
variety of businesses and professions. It is much closer in form and
dollar figures to the income in the top 5% as opposed to the top
0.01%, where most of the wealth comes from investment income,

often via successful public offerings from founder stock. It is much
easier to think of the policy issues in terms of taxation and not the
antitrust law as applied to labor, whether it be a heightened capital
gains tax, a wealth tax, or higher estate tax

The situation at the bottom between Obama and Trump is, if
anything, more instructive about the difference between classical

liberal

and

progressive

policies.

Here

again,

Krugman-like

pessimism seems peculiarly out of place. Wage levels at the bottom
increased more rapidly than at the top, which meant that minority

workers did especially well under Trump. They certainly did better
than they did under Obama, which hardly sounds like an exercise in
monopsony power against the downtrodden. 82 This trend is further
substantiated by observing the changes to median household
income -reported below in Table 1 from the year 1990 to the year
2019-that occurred during the two administrations. 83

s2 See Editorial Board, The HigherWages ofGrowth, Before The Pandemic, Income Growth
Soared and Poverty Fell to the Lowest Rate Since 1959, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/ F4JZ-PUBS].

83 Id. As the article

further explains,
Real median U.S. household income last year rose by $4,379 to $68,709. In
dollar amounts, this is nearly 50% more than during the eight years of
Barack Obama's Presidency. The wealthy last year benefited from a roaring
stock market, as they did during most of the Obama years.
But lower and middle-income folks were also finally sharing more in the
country's growing wealth. Notably, median household incomes increased

more among Hispanics (7.1%), blacks (7.9%), Asians (10.6%) and foreignborn workers (8.5%) versus whites (5.7%) and native-born Americans
(6.2%). One reason is more Americans with lower education levels were
working.

Id.
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Table 1: Median Household Income in the United States from 1990 to
201984
Year

Median Income (2019 U.S.

Dollars)
2019

68,703

2018

64,324

2017

62,626

2016

60,309

2015

58,476

2014

55,613

2013

56,479

2012

54,569

2011

54,673

2010

55,520

2009

57,010

2008

57,412

2007

59,534

s4 STATISTA RES. DEP'T, Median Household Income in the United States 1990 to 2019 (Jan.
20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P7E7-95V6].
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2006

58,746

2005

58,291

2004

57,674

2003

57,875

2002

57,947

2001

58,609

2000

59,938

1999

60,062

1998

58,612

1997

56,533

1996

55,394

1995

54,600

1994

52,942

1993

52,334

1992

52,615

1991

53,025

1990

54,621
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To a classical liberal, moreover, the result is no surprise. Various
regulatory and tax burdens tend to rise more slowly than income, so
that these increased burdens in the Obama years hurt poorer workers

more than rich ones, by taking a larger chunk of their disposable
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income and yielding a higher percentage wage increase. Fortunately,
the reverse is also true, so that any form of market liberalization will
give a larger stimulus at the bottom than at the top, which again
shows just how much tax and labor policy will influence

employment levels and wages on a day-to-day basis. Put otherwise,
macroeconomic variables such as total money supply are not the

relevant drivers of labor markets. It is the direct forms of subsidy and
regulation that have unmediated effects. Increased antitrust
enforcement is an occasional occurrence and its anticipated effects
should be far smaller.

NPW take a skeptical view of this issue, for they tend to regard
workers at all levels as a beaten down group with no collective
powers. At one point they write: "Union activity has collapsed in the

United

States

because

of

deregulation,

foreign

competition,

aggressive anti-union tactics by employers, and a chilly legal
environment." 85 None of that applies of course to public unions,

whose influence remains powerful among teachers, police and
firefighters, prison guards, and nurses. Even against private
employers, though, strong union movements could easily cost jobs
by shutting down firms, which has been the fate of many workers in
such industries as automobiles and steel, where membership has
shrunk precisely because unions overplayed their hand.86 But today,
it would be foolish to ignore a risk that now looms now large given

labor shortages have induced more aggressive union action and
given the chronic shortages in labor markets, already noted.
The recent actions are only the last chapter in a constant
evolution of labor markers, which are evolving in several directions,
all of which tend to increase the relevant scope of geographical
markets. Right now, telecommuting plays a large role for many

upper division firms, whose workers are so widely distributed that
geographical constraints are weakly defined by time zones rather

s Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 542.
86 See Richard A. Epstein, Labor Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAPITAL UNIV. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2013).
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Second, the emergence
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of highly

sophisticated job matching programs expand the scope of both
geographical and service markets and thus again increase the scope
of options for both employers and employees alike. Both of these
elements cut against the monopsony model.
These developments, among others, are reflected by the general
turnover figures. On this regard, it is important to realize that net
changes in jobs -say, 900,000 new jobs created in a good monthsystematically understates the dynamism in labor markets. The

correct measure is to add the sum of quits to the sum of hires. Right
now, the evidence shows that quit rates are higher than dismissal
rates, so that there is now a record number of vacancies in the job

market, which is attributable in part to the decision of the Biden
administration to offer $300 no-questions-asked grants to a large
segment of the work force. Anyhow, one recent BLS release shows
the imbalance:
In June [2021], the quits level and rate increased to 3.9 million
(+239,000) and 2.7 percent, respectively. Quits increased in

professional and business services (+72,000); durable goods
manufacturing (+47,000); and state and local government,

excluding education (+33,000). Quits decreased in state and
local government education (-26,000).

In June, the number of layoffs and discharges was little
changed at 1.3 million, a series low. The rate was unchanged
at 0.9 percent, matching last month's series low. Layoffs and
discharges were little changed in all four regions.87

These ratios are not immutable, of course, for in bad times the
layoffs can be twice the hires, while in good times the reverse ratio
holds true. In addition, the rate of turnover within firms is higher

than would be expected if there were strong monopsony power.

$7 U.S BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary (Aug. 9,
2021) [https://perma.cc/HZ93-R6P9] (including statistics for June 2021).
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Thus, it is instructive to look at the employee turnover statistics at
the firm level. If firms had dominant power, workers would be
desperate to hang on to the jobs that they have.88 But, the story is
otherwise. The two major takeaways are that voluntary turnover

among workers is high and that a top priority for firms is to reduce
turnover at all levels. Thus, total turnover levels are around 18% of a
workforce per annum, which means that large companies are always

in the process of replacement of the current workforce. Of that figure,
about one-third or 6% is attributable to reduction in force or to
termination for poor performance, both of which are costly for a firm.
The other two-thirds or 12% of the workforce are from voluntary
quits, usually of individuals whom the firm wishes to retain. As one
might expect, the turnover rates are highest among younger workers,
chiefly in the service industries. These rates are lower for senior

workers and for those in professional positions. The former
phenomenon occurs because the shorter time horizons for older

workers makes it more difficult to recoup the front-end investments
that both sides have to make in new jobs. The latter phenomenon
occurs because the higher the professional status attainable the more

asset specificity of the skills. This turnover rate is not a sign of
monopsony power, but in some instances reflects a bilateral
monopoly situation, similar in kind to that which arises on the
renewal of a residential or business lease. But either way, the cost of

finding a replacement is never cheap and, in some cases, can run to
twice annual salary.
In light of these basic figures, we should expect that both sides
will try to find ways to extricate themselves from these problems.
Firms begin by coaching managers on how to relate to workers to

avoid quits attributable

to bad morale

or a breakdown in

communications. They hope to develop a job esprit so that when
workers do leave they help to recruit their replacement. It takes a

88 Marc Holliday, 50 Employee Turnover Statistics to Know Today, ORACLE NETSUITE
(Jan. 5, 2021) [https:// perma.cc/BK8T-BCDY].
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very short time in a managerial position to realize that culture and

morale are the start of successful firms no matter the market
environment in which they work.

Firms can expand the pool of available workers by investing in
training programs that can expand the pool of available talent. They

can offer signing bonuses, various perks, or better benefit packages.
This hardly sounds like a system in which exploited workers are

driven back to subsidence wages. Workers can enroll in a
bewildering array of training programs to advance within their
chosen field or to shift fields altogether. Overall, the movement levels
are high in good times and in bad, which suggests that labor markets

are typically competitive and more dynamic that the monopsony
market model predicts. In this world, a prediction that employers can
depress wages by as much as 17 percent, as the Biden executive order
claims, looks like sheer fantasy, for it presupposes that such large
gaps go unnoticed in labor markets, when the far more likely account
is that there will be a group of savvy entrepreneurs who can sniff out
these profits opportunities. 89
The simplest explanation for the decline in union power is that,
notwithstanding the legal protections, unions cannot deliver for their

members durable benefits that exceed their private costs of
unionization. The firm that is unionized risks losing out to
competitors. The workers within the unions are barred from moving

s9 on this point, see, for example, Don Boudreaux, Assertions are Cheap, CAF HAYEK
(Sept. 27, 2021) [https://perma.cc/NHG7-HXHM] (criticizing Posner's New York
Times Op Ed., You Deserve a Bigger Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, September 24 at A23, whose
title overstates the extent of "wage suppression and inequality caused by the power of
employers in labor markets."). Boudreaux writes:
To back his assertion, Prof. Posner refers to "academic research on labor
markets" that allegedly shows that "millions of Americans are paid
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars less than they should be
paid." Well, I can point to academic research on labor markets that shows
the opposite, namely, that growth in worker pay has kept pace with growth
in worker productivity. This finding is inconsistent with the prevalence of
monopsony power.
Boudreaux, supra.
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governance structure

gives

disproportionate power to senior workers, which makes new
entrants leery to join these firms.9 0

Nonetheless, there is a determined point of view that downplays
the monopoly power of unions and treats them as the best institution
in the best of all possible worlds. An early study from the Economic
Policy Institute takes the Panglossian view that explains "How
Unions Help All Workers." 91 The source of that optimism is a set of

well-accepted numbers that states: "Unions raise wages of unionized
workers by roughly 20% and raise compensation, including both
wages and benefits, by about 28%." 92 That number is highly
instructive because it explains why successful unions can attract

workers -by delivering net benefits in excess of their costs to union
members. But, after that the argument gets far murkier: "Unions

reduce wage inequality because they raise wages more for low- and
middle-wage workers than for higher-wage workers, more for bluecollar than for white-collar workers, and more for workers who do
not have a college degree." 93 Within a static model, this so-called

distributional improvement must take into account the net reduction
in workers in that field

and the parallel reduction in other

nonunionized workers that work in complementary fields, so that
the distributional effects on workers are far muddier than this brief
conclusion assumes. In addition, premium wages will lead to higher

consumer prices, so that the unionized worker now has to pay more
for goods. There is a negative correlation between worker benefits
and social benefits, which hits non-union workers who do not get
higher wages and benefits but pay higher prices. The wage increases

are equally hard on company shareholders, who see reduced profits

90 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 70 (John
M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 452, 2009).
91 Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL'Y

INST. (2003) [https:// perma.cc/J3KS-RHH7].
92 Id. at 1.
93
d.
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without sharing in the union gains. Under the static model, then,
unions reduce overall social welfare, just like any other monopolist.

The outcomes look even worse under a dynamic model because
these

large

wage

differentials

are not sustainable

in global

competitive markets, so that the share of unionized workers drops
dramatically, as new non-unionized competitors, both domestic and
foreign, chip away at the dominant position that the share of
unionized workers drops dramatically. General Motors had nearly

400,000 workers in 1970,94 but only 243,000 workers in 2008 when it
went through bankruptcy reorganization. 9s That case offers a
microcosm of the long-term decline of union labor in the workforce
from about 35% in 1954 to a little over 6% today.96 Those figures show
that the Panglossian labor union model is not sustainable, so why
should writers who are so intent at finding that monopsony power

by firms who have no legal protections ignore union power backed
by government force?
This pessimistic critique of the union influence is not just a matter
of economic theory. It is also borne out by looking at the striking

difference between the Obama administration, with its strongly prounion polices, and the Trump administration policies that tended in
the opposite direction. Nor need we only look at national policies, for
there is much evidence to support the proposition that Right-toWork (RTW) states have more robust job growth than states that
ignore that option. 97 All this evidence helps explain why labor
migration is out of high-tax and high-regulated states into those

94 Todd Seibt, Painful Numbers Behind the UAW-GM Decline, MLIvE (April 5, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/8T72-FF2G].
95 Reuters Staff, Factbox: Key Facts about General Motors, REUTERS (May 29, 2009)

[https://perma.cc/ 7XQ2-JMWD].
96 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.

STAT.,

Union Members Summary

(Jan.

22, 2021)

[https://perma.cc/2L8W-RH3W].
97 See Sean P. Redmond, Right-to-Work Law: The Economic Evidence (2018 Update), U.S.
CHAMBER OF CoM. (May 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QYJ3-EUS5] (noting more rapid
growth between 2001 and 2016 in private-sector employment for RTW states: 27% for
RTW states compared to 15% in non-RTW states; 0.4% lower unemployment in RTW
states; 38% growth in output in RTW states compared to 29% for non-RTW states).
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which are not. As the following graphic indicates, people vote with

their feet, notwithstanding the high private costs of picking up and
moving out.98
Where Did Americans Move in 2020?
tat MiratioiPterns.fPrm Most lnbound to Most

;

:. :.T,
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Outbound

2020
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That surge also explains why both Volkswagen 99 and Amazon100
were able to survive unionization drives in southern states. Again,

an increase in competitive forces supplies the answer.
The poor performance of pro-union policies at the national and
state level is likely to repeat itself in the Biden administration, which

9s Janelle Cammenga, Where Did Americans Move in 2020?, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 13,
2021) [https://perma.cc/ B9CC-AY8P].
99 Bobby Allyn, Tennessee Workers Reject Union at Volkswagen Plant- Again, NPR
(June 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PYA4-FR3R].
100 Alina Selyukh, It's a No: Amazon Warehouse Workers Vote Against Unionizing in
HistoricElection, NPR (Apr. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B4UG-Z4GG].

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

2022] THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO LABOR MARKETS - THEN AND NOw

365

preaches that "[i]t has never been more important for us to invest in
strengthening our infrastructure and competitiveness, and in
creating the good-paying, union jobs of the future."101 Biden shows
not the slightest awareness of the mortal tension between his first two
objectives and the last, which is only compounded when that same
White House Report states as its policy objective: "[To c]reate goodquality jobs that pay prevailing wages in safe and healthy

workplaces while ensuring workers have a free and fair choice to
organize,

join a

union,

and

bargain

collectively

with their

employers."1 02 "Prevailing wages" are union wages, so this passage
should be read as an endorsement of the 1931 Davis-Bacon
legislationo 3 that was intended to prevent southern black workers

from competing for government jobs in the North. 104 Today, the
Biden administration supports the PRO Act - Protecting the Right to
Organize Act of 2021,105 a strong labor piece of regulation. Here is not
the place to argue the merits of the bill, save to mention that it is

intended to strengthen the monopoly position of workers. The forces
on both sides of this struggle commit enormous resources towards
its resolution because they well know that the choice of rules really
matters. Yet, the writers who are strong in applying the antitrust laws
against employers are strangely quiet when it comes to curbing the

monopoly power of public and private unions.
These general observations are reinforced by a brief look at some
mishaps that arise when either the federal or state governments
directly regulate labor markets. For those who are concerned about
monopoly power, the HHI for government actions is a perfect 10,000
because the regulations themselves are intended to preclude various

101 THE WHITE HoUsE, FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan (Mar. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/ C3XN-KAXX].

102

Id.

See Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, Pub. L. No. 71-789, 46 Stat. 1494.
See, e.g., Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings: Hearing on S. 5904
Before the S. Comm. on Manufactures,71st Cong. 10-11 (1931); 74 CONG. REC. 6513 (1931)
103

104

(comments of Rep. Miles C. Allgood).
105

H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).
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forms of private action that might soften the scope of the government
intervention. They in effect introduce a variety of control over wages
and terms that would be per se illegal if formed by voluntary
agreement.
The first concern involves efforts by the Obama administration
to expand the reach of labor law by invoking a broad definition of
"employer" under the NLRA so as to create a new type of "joint
employment" relationship whenever a given company contracts out

some of its work to an independent business. The traditional rule, as
announced in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania,
Inc.,106 was that the NLRA only reaches employers who hire their

own workers and subject those workers to direct management
control. Other employers that used these workers on a short-term
basis were not caught by the definition. When the Obama NLRB
revisited the issue in 2015 in Browning-Ferris Industries of California,

Inc. (Browning-Ferris II),107 it reversed course and for the first time
held

that a so-called

joint employer

(i.e.,

one with

limited

responsibilities) could be treated as an employer under the Act even
if it had not exercised any "any direct and immediate control" of the
terms and conditions of employment for workers with other full-time
employers. It takes little imagination to see that complex business

arrangements could spew forth a huge number of these transitory
joint relationships. That one ruling would have allowed any union to
have two (or more) unionization targets, thereby expands the

potential scope of the statute. The Trump administration put an end
to that maneuver in February 2020 by restoring the original rule that
the only time the joint employer rule applies is when two employers
share equal direct control over a given employee. 108 In July 2021, the

106
107

691 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1982).
362 NLRB 1599 (2015).

108 NLRB, NLRB
Issues Joint-Employer
[https://perma.cc/WTS3-D3MP].

Final

Rule
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Biden administration announced that it intends to rescind the
original rule in restoration of the 2015 rule. 109
In a related development, the Obama NLRB took the position
that a franchisor such as McDonald's could be held liable under the

NLRA, in some undefined set of particular circumstances, for any
unfair labor practice committed by any one of its thousands of
franchisees.1 0 It is well understood that for franchising to work there
must be precise division of control between the franchisor and the
franchisee. The former has to guarantee uniform quality in order to
support the brand. The same Big Mac has to be for sale everywhere
to get customers to come to new locations while traveling, for
example. But, the latter has to have the power to hire and fire workers
in order to maintain control over the workshop. Those incentives

only work if the franchisee makes an extensive equity investment in
the firm. But, it was not clear whether this long-term stable
relationship could survive if the new form of vicarious liability was
in place such that McDonald's or other franchisors could be found

guilty of unfair labor practices because of actions by the franchisee.
A franchisor could stand back from controlling labor issues, only to

face an onslaught of suits that it would be ill-equipped to defend. Or
it could intervene, at which point its franchisees lose the direct

control over day-to-day operations that makes the model such a
success. The reach of these arrangements was extensive: when the
rule was announced in 2015, franchisors had about 750,000 outlets,
employing 8.1 million workers and generating about $770 billion per
year, all of which could be put at risk by a change in approach.ml1 The

rejection of the dominant model would have put an entire industry

109 Rescission of Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Rule, 84

Fed. Reg. 40,939 (July 30, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 791); U.S. DEFP'T OF LAB.,
U. S. Department of Labor Announces FinalRule to Rescind March 2020 Joint Employer Rule,
Ensure More Workers Minimum Wage, Overtime Protections (July 29, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/ E55K-KK6Y].
11o

For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, McDonald's v. NLRB, HOOVER INST.

(Feb. 9, 2015) [https://perma.cc/T8Q5-USQT].
m11 Id.
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to the unhappy choice of deciding which inferior choice should be

followed.
A third similar initiative under the NLRB was the ill-conceived

effort of the Obama administration to classify all graduate research
assistants (especially in the hard sciences) as employees subject to
both the NLRA and the FLSA. The model does not work anywhere.
Graduate teaching assistants are not employees of their research

supervisors for their advanced degrees. And for the physical
sciences, it is impossible to separate out graduate studies from
instructional duties for the purpose of computing overtime
payments. Nonetheless, in August 2016, the three member
Democratic majority in Trustees of Columbia University v. Graduate
Workers of Columbia-GWC, in yet another board flip-flop, held that

graduate students counted as employees under Section 2(3) of the
NLRA which provides, most unhelpfully, that "the term 'employee'
shall include any employee," subject to a list of important but
irrelevant statutory exceptions. 112 At the time, Yale University
President Peter Salovey observed that he had "long been concerned

that this relationship would become less productive and rewarding
under a formal collective bargaining regime, in which professors

would be 'supervisors' of their graduate student 'employees.'"113
Indeed, Yale filed an amicus brief to voice its concerns.1 14

112 The Trs. of Columbia

Univ. in the City of N.Y. & Graduate Workers of

Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (2016). That decision overruled Brown
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004), which in turn had overruled New York Univ., 332
N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
113 NLRB Rules that Graduate Students are Employees, YALENEWS (Aug. 23, 2016)

[https://perma.cc/L9VU-E9YG]. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Obama's
Labor Market Mischief, HOOVER INST. (Nov. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/PN2B-UNS2].
114 Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University et al., The Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the

City of N.Y. & Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 NLRB No. 90 (2016).
For a discussion of this brief on behalf of a consortium of major research institutions
and a parallel brief by the American Association of University Professors, see Richard
A. Epstein, Graduate Students as Protected "Employees", HOOVER INST. (Aug. 29, 2016)

[https://perma.cc/ 3Z6A-CGCQ].
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The same definitional issue took place in connection with the
FLSA when in May 2016 the Department of Labor issued a rule that

provided that executive, administrative, and professional employees
would be exempt from the overtime regulations only if their wages
were above $921 per week, or $47,892 per year, up from the earlier

figure of $455 per week, or $23,660 per year.l15 The difference
between the two numbers implicated huge numbers of graduate
research fellows, which could have turned the entire area into a

reporting nightmare save for the fact that a federal judge enjoined the
overtime rule in November 2016. 116 The Trump administration
subsequently declined to renew the earlier Obama-era interpretation
and instead ultimately raised the figure to $35,568 annually, thereby

taking much of the sting out of the Obama administration
approach.11 7
The FLSA has also been a huge source of contention in dealing

with the position of so-called EAP (executive, administrative and
professional workers), who are in general exempt from the overtime
regulations. As a matter of ordinary English, police sergeants and
lieutenants fall into that category because of their oversight of
inferior employees. Nonetheless, in the famous decision in Auer v.

Robbins,1s Justice Scalia deferred to an agency interpretation that
excluded these workers from the class because their salaries could be

docked for various infractions of their employment contracts. The
Auer deference has largely been eviscerated in the subsequent
decision of Kisor v. Wilkie.ll 9 For these purposes, what matters is that
Auer deference is consistent with an administrative flip-flop between

115

Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,

Administrative,

Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391 (May 23,
2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
116 Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
t7 Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,230 (Sept. 27,

2019) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
ts 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
119 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

370

New York UniversityJournal of Law & Liberty

[Vol.15:327

Democratic and Republican administrations that clearly has a huge

effect on large number of employees in both the public and private
sectors. 120

The classification of employees is perhaps most important when
drawing a distinction between employees and independent
contractors. That line is easy to draw when one firm hires another

firm to do specialized work, which is then the sole employer of its
workers. But, the line becomes difficult to draw when one firm claims
that the individual workers whom it hires should be treated as

independent contractors, especially when some of them do work
similar to that of full-time employees. The law has developed a full
array of tests to determine whether a given worker is his or her own

boss, often turning of the locus of decision-making powers on given
tasks.1 2 1 That issue came to the fore in Dynamex OperationsWest, Inc.
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 122 where the California
Supreme Court noted the high stakes that turned on this

classification:
[I]f a worker should properly be classified as an employee,
the hiring business bears the responsibility of paying federal
Social Security and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance

taxes and state employment taxes, providing worker's
compensation insurance, and, most relevant for the present
case, complying with numerous state and federal statutes
and regulations governing the wages, hours, and working
conditions of employees. 123
The court held that this matter could not be left to the parties to
resolve as a contractual issue, given the regulatory overlay. It then

120 For a more detailed discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY
OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 131-37 (2020).

121 For some measure of the complexities in the ride sharing business, see Saleem v.

Corp. Transp. Grp, Ltd., 854 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2017).
122 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
123

Id.

at 5.
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adopted the so-called "ABC test," which limited independent
contractors to cases that satisfied three conditions:
(a) that the worker is free from the control and direction of
the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the

work, both under the contract for the performance of the
work and in fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that
is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and
(c)

that

the

worker

is

customarily

engaged

in

an

independently established trade, occupation, or business of
the same nature as that involved in the work performed. 1 24
Virtually all workers within the gig economy are employees
under the Dynamex test given the control that the major firm has to

exert over workers to assure the quality control necessary for brand
protection. At this point, the ongoing controversy concerns whether
that test is sustainable. In 2019, California passed Assembly Bill 5,

which first incorporated the ABC test subject to an extensive and
exhaustive list of exemptions for particular professions, including
physicians, attorneys, and accountants. 125 Uber and Lyft, among
others, claimed that they were tech-matching services and not

employers, which in turn led to a wide range of cases on both sides
of the matter. The reports of market dislocations in many professions,
like translators and court reporters, filled the press and in turn led to
passage of a referendum in California that cut back on the scope of
Assembly Bill 5. Here is not the place to go into detail as to how this

interference with contractual freedom led to dubious results. But, it
is important to note that this issue has remained front page news
thereafter, given the overreach of the original legislation. Thus,

Assembly Bill 2257 backtracked further from the ABC test by adding

2

1 4 Id. at 34.
125

Act of Sep.18, 2019, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 296 (A.B. 5) (West) (codified at CAL.

LAB. CODE 99 2750.3, 3351, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 99 606.5, 621).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

372

New York UniversityJournal of Law & Liberty

[Vol.15:327

in yet another set of job categories exempt from the rule. 1 26 Two
months later, voters passed Proposition 22, which contained a

provision championed by Uber, Lyft, and Door Dash that in effect
reversed Dynamex for the very class of ride services and delivery
apps that were covered in the original decision. 127 Clearly, these
decisions have huge impacts on the operation of these critical labor

markets. But, I see no evidence that an antitrust inquiry should be
launched to ask whether these dominant industry players commit
antitrust violations with their workers in a market in which labor

mobility is at its height, given that workers work for two or more of
these companies at any given time.
III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND LABOR MARKETS TODAY

The first order of business for anyone who believes in
competition in labor markets -and not redistribution of wealth to
workers -should be a repeal of the many labor statutes that protect

market cartelization or segmentation that if not immunized by
statute would count as per se violations of the antitrust law. It should,
therefore, be incumbent on the writers who support antitrust reform

126

Act of Sep. 4, 2020, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (A.B. 2257) (West) (codified at

CAL. LAB. CODE §9 2775-87).
127 Sara Ashley O'Brien, Prop 22 Passes in California, Exempting Uber and Lyft from
Classifying Drivers as Employees, CNN Bus. (Nov. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VN3M-

8E2Q]. Prop 22 was held unconstitutional in August, 2021 in Castellanosv. California,

No.

RG21088725,

2021

Cal.

Super.

LEXIS

7285

(Aug.

20,

2021)

[https://perma.cc/8MVP-GGB5], on the grounds that under California law the
initiative failed because it contained a provision that purported to insulate it from
legislative revision, which is not allowable under article XIV, section 4 of the California
Constitution:
The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited
by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete
system of workers' compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that
behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to
compensate any or all of their workers for injury or disability, and their
dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workers in the
course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party.
CAL. CONST. art. XIV, @ 4.
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to speak out against these various rules and call for their repeal,

unless they could supply some special efficiency justification for
these practices, which are hard to come by.
Thus, to give but one example, it has often been said that unions

facilitate communications between firms and their workers. But, the
claim ignores the fact that union members have no right to speak
directly with employers, unless the union approves of the exchange,
such that this artificial barrier blocks much needed communication.

-

There is, of course, often a need for collective communication
between the firm and its workers. Historically, company unions
which did not have the power to strike -served that particular role,
but their influence has been sharply diminished since the NLRA

declared that working with a company union would constitute an
unfair labor practice. 128
These other factors, of course, do not have any effect on the
analysis of various practices that explicitly seek to divide markets in
ways contrary to the antitrust law. Defenders of using the antitrust
law in labor markets start their exploration into this topic by noting

several well-publicized actions to thwart this form of express market
division by the use of covenants not-to-compete. They note that over
ten years ago the Justice Department was able to secure a major
financial settlement for $415 million from several major tech

companies like Google and Apple, which had agreed among
themselves not to steal each other's employees. 129 Here, there is no
doubt that the agreement looks to be in restraint of trade, which in
turn invites a rule of reason analysis to see if there is some

explanation for these restraints. In some cases, the protection of key
trade secrets (with uncertain depreciation rates) might make the
restriction justifiable, and if it does, we should expect that employees
will receive some sort of wage premium or collateral benefit up front

128 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, @ 8(a)(2), 49 Stat.
449, 452.
129 See Lance Whitney, Apple, Google, Others Settle Antipoaching Lawsuit for $415
Million, CNET (Sept. 3, 2015) [https:/ /perma.cc/ TY2J-M8UK].
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to offset those additional burdens. These adjustments are easy to
postulate, likely to occur, and hard to prove. Nor should we expect
employment contracts to be the only method employers use to
protect these secrets. Self-help arrangements are also possible, so

firms devise internal classifications for trade secrets and for the most
valuable of these take steps to divide and limit access so as to reduce
the risk of theft or leakage, such that the loss of one piece of a formula
has less of a chance of revealing the entirety of the trade secret. But
here again, it is hard to generalize. In many areas, even knowing a

single piece of information could make it easier for outsiders to infer
the overall structure of research or operations from some apparently
random piece of information. That is certainly the way in which
criminal and military interrogation works with hostile targets. But, it

is even easier to obtain relevant information from new receptive
employees or other sources who have every reason to share
information with the new employer, not to conceal it.

That leaves open the issue of what happens if many firms in a
competitive market independently decide to adopt a similar set of
restrictions on labor mobility. Given the analysis in Mitchel, it
appears as though these restrictions should also be subject to a rule

of reason analysis, with the balance tipped perhaps more in favor of
the individual employer, as it is under current law. 3 0 The situation
is still more complex because it could easily be that cases of this sort
raise (at least in part) a classic prisoner's dilemma game. All firms
would be better off if they could freely poach, especially since high
turnover rates are very much a part of the innovation world - which

incidentally counts as evidence against the supposed immobility of
labor in a market characterized by new entry and frequent exit. At
this point, a public law that imposes additional restraints on the

ability of individual firms to impose these restrictions could easily
make sense - at least if some allowance is made for certain key cases

13o

See supra notes 31-34, 48-53.
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in which the trade secret issue looms large. 131 What is critical to note
in this case is that the poaching cases give no reason whatsoever to

change the basic framework that is used to govern activities in
product markets.
The situation at the bottom end of the market also bears some
notice. Marinescu and Posner note the highly publicized revelation
that Jimmy John's, a sandwich chain, required its low-wage

employees to sign covenants not-to-compete. That firm was not
alone, for they cite a study that shows that about 53.3% of major

franchisors required their workers to sign no poaching agreements
in 2016-up from 35.6% in 1996.132 Those same results are found in
the paper by Colvin and Shierholz, which note their wide use at all
levels of the market. 133 They also refer to work that indicates that

"being bound by a noncompete is associated with an 11% decrease
in turnover time." 134 But the point is neither here or there without
some strong account as to whether that decrease improves or hurts

company performance. Given the obvious costs of high turnover to
firms, the more likely explanation is that the situation represents a

social improvement and argument for keeping the current law in
place. Put otherwise, it looks as if the widespread use of these
agreements is evidence of their value and not evidence of some
restrictive consequence in a few cases. And, if it is said that both
efficiency and restrictive effects are at issue, it is clearly not worth the
blunt instrument of antitrust law to disentangle them. There have
been vast swings in labor markets over recent years, and, all the
while, the law of non-competes has been relatively stable. It is
doubtful that their use has been the source of any significant

dislocation.

131 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 138, and Covenants Not-to-Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575

(1999) (noting that Silicon Valley growth relative to Route 138 in Massachusetts was
at least partially attributable to the higher levels of labor mobility).
132 Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 545.
133 Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 5.
3

1 4

Id.
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That conclusion can be strengthened by taking a look at the
specifics of these covenants in light of the context in which they arise.
One example comes from McDonald's, whose agreement with its

franchisees (not the employees) is intended to prevent them from
poaching each other's employees:
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the
term of this Franchise, Franchisee shall not employ or seek to

employ any person who is at the time employed by
McDonald's, any of its subsidiaries, or by any person who is
at the time operating a McDonald's restaurant or otherwise
induce, directly or indirectly, such person to leave such
employment. This paragraph [] shall not be violated if such

person has left the employ of any of the foregoing parties for
a period in excess of six (6) months.1 35
Before asking about the validity of these restrictions, it is useful
to ask why McDonald's would opt to incur these costs. The simple

answer appears to be that the labor markets are sufficiently
competitive that a modest bidding war among rival franchisees of
the same franchisor could increase their overall cost of doing

business, and thus work to the disadvantage of McDonald's in its
complex oversight of multiple franchisee relationships. Recall that in
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 136 the United States

Supreme Court held that a rule of reason applied when a
manufacturer limited the number of franchisees that it would license

in any given area and instructed them to sell products only for those
locations for which they had obtained a franchise. If a franchisor can
impose vertical restraints on its franchisee resellers subject to the rule
of reason, it should be able to impose similar vertical limitations on

135 POSNER, supranote 8, at 56-59. See also Marinescu & Posner, supra note 16, at 1385

n.205 (quoting Deslandes v. McDonald's USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018)).
136 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling the rule of per se illegality found in United States

v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
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these franchises with respect to their employees. Thus, suppose that
all outlets were owned by McDonald's -itself an inefficient solution,
given the need to incentivize on-site owners to manage the business.
Without question, McDonald's could impose these restrictions on its
own employees. There seems therefore little reason to say that once
McDonald's resorts to a franchise model, it has to tolerate
competition among its franchisees that will reduce the overall
efficiency of the operation, given that it could achieve the same result

if they adopted an inefficient form of vertical integration. Posner
recognizes the force of this argument,137 but then insists that ordinary

frictions in job turnover are sufficient to protect employers on the
ground that they make little investment in these employees. But, the
extent of these investments may well be substantial, and the noncompete could well induce higher levels of training. Indeed, the large

number of employees covered suggests that McDonald's is more
concerned about turnover than with any loss of information. It is also
not clear that the carrot in this case works better than the stick.

McDonald's could also offer bonuses at the end of year or
educational allowances to workers that take the form of tuition
guarantees. The worker pays the fee and the company picks up some
fraction of it for each year that the worker remains. None of these
devices are perfect, but alone or in combination, they suggest that the
rule of reason analysis may be close and that, as a general rule, it is
best to engage in costly antitrust litigation and enforcement only in
clear cases, not in those where the crosscurrents are sufficiently
powerful that a rule of per se illegality looks like overkill.

It is, of course, an entirely different situation to restrict their
movement to different firms outside the McDonald's system, which
this clause does not do. A departure outside of the McDonald's
family will in most cases require the sacrifice of some firm-specific
techniques and a loss of seniority and other privileges associated
with the older job, which make it less likely that any worker will opt

137 POSNER,

supra note 8, at 58-59.
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for this choice in the absence of any change in personal
circumstances.
Finally, it is always possible to waive these conditions in certain

circumstances, if for example one outlet was short of workers when
a nearby outlet faces a decline in business. It would be useful,
therefore, to examine empirically how and when these waivers are

given and their terms and conditions, including such key matters as
whether transfer fees are paid or whether the releases tend to be
individual or reciprocal. Note too that this provision has a six-month
tail, in contrast to the nonunion (or yellow-dog) pledges in Hitchman
Coal, which lasted only so long as workers remained in the mine

operator's employ. That distinction makes sense because the risk in
the coal case was that all workers would walk off the job in unison,
but in the franchisee case the risk is that a worker will quit, take a

short vacation, and then work for another franchisee, rendering the
labor restriction provision totally ineffective.
IV.

IMPLICIT RESTRICTIONS

The far harder question comes with respect to practices that are
said to violate the antitrust laws because their practical effects create

some form of monopoly power. The initial difficulty with these
approaches is that the position does not consider the differences in
form and operation between the two sides of the market. Put
otherwise, the standard HHI approach does not resonate here. Quite
simply, labor market power is not a "mirror image" of product
market power. 138 Thus, NPW start with an illustration of how it is
that a few gasoline companies in a given town could collude to raise
prices on a single commodity, gasoline. Whether that is true is an

open issue given that by definition drivers are mobile and, thus, have
a wide range of location at which to make their purchases. Thus, in

Chicago, it is a common practice for frequent consumers of gasoline,
e.g., taxi cabs, to cross state lines to take advantage of the lower tax

1s

Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 538.
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rates in Indiana or simply to travel to the western suburbs to refuel.

(I happily plead guilty to the practice.) So even on the product side,
matters are questionable. But even if we grant this premise, there is
basically only one standardized commodity sold directly to
consumers that is at issue.

Yet, now consider the supposedly mirror image case:
For example, imagine the gas stations employ specialist
maintenance workers who monitor the gas pumping

equipment. If only a few gas stations exist in that area, and
no other firms (for example, oil refineries) hire from this pool
of workers, then the labor market is concentrated, and the
employers have market power in the labor market. To
minimize labor costs, the employers will hold wages down

below what the workers would be paid in a competitive
labor market - their marginal revenue product. Thus, some

people qualified to work will refuse to do so, but the
employers gain more from wage savings than they lose from
having a more limited pool of workers from which to hire. 139

To start, just ask this question: how many specialists workers are
there in this industry? If their number is small, they may be able to
organize an informal cartel. At that point, they may well have the

advantage, for they only need tend to one particular service or
commodity. The gasoline stations, in contrast, must operate in many
different labor markets at any given time and, thus, are likely to have
greater difficulty in focusing on an issue that may be one percent of
their costs, even if it is 100 percent of the revenue on the other side.
Worse still, this model works from an implicit assumption that
the gasoline stations enter into an employment relationship with

individual workers to discharge all their business functions. But in
many cases, the real business decision is whether the gasoline station
should hire these workers or contract out the entire business to a

139 Id. at 539.
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specialist firm. In most cases, subcontracting with an independent
firm will be the preferred solution. It could take a team of different
specialists to deal with the gas pumping equipment, and it becomes
prohibitively expensive to hire specialists who have to remain idle 99

percent of the time or undertake other work that does not take
advantage of their distinctive skills. So, the sensible arrangement is

for an independent contractor to service multiple services stations, as
well as other kinds of clients with similar equipment, so that these

workers can be kept in productive use, if possible, throughout the
workday. It is equally likely that these firms will not be able to obtain

sufficient business by dealing with a few stations in a single town, so
they will work from a central location and take care of gas stations
within, say, a 50-mile radius of their home base or franchise out to

cover wider territories. As that geographical network spreads, it is
likely that more than a single firm will fill that niche. At this point,
the organization of the labor market involves far smaller revenue
amounts and a far larger number of transactions, with a highly

complicated structure and no clear idea of what should be done to
figure out what happens. There are good reasons to stress the
product market, gasoline, and not the service market for a wide array
of different workers.
A similar analysis applies to yet another of NPW's examples.
They write, "Imagine that a small town has four large firms that

manufacture widgets for the national market."140 But, it is very hard
to imagine this story. First of all, widgets may be manufactured at
other locations, so we don't know the fraction of the product market
they hold. Second, there is nothing that says that one small town can

sustain four large factories, without drawing workers from outside.
Third, there is no reason to assume that the four firms that make
identical, or more likely, similar products, or that they necessarily use

the same techniques for fabrication. Some firms could have better
locations than others, a different set of trade secrets, newer or older

140 Id. at 574.
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equipment from distinct brands, diverse subcontracting policies, or
individualized loading docks and physical plants. It would be a
mistake therefore to assume that they all seek the same proportion of
labor for the same tasks. And, once there is some differentiation
between firms, the labor market looks more fragmented, such that it
is unclear which forms of labor should be included in the relevant
market. Given that fragmentation, it is hardly likely that the

monopsony power is possessed by a single firm. But, once there are
two or more firms that work independently in a given labor space,
the level of monopsony power starts to shrink dramatically, just as
the levels of industry concentration shrink dramatically under the
HHI with the movement from 1 to 2 firms in a given space.141 To
make matters still more complicated, there is no reason to assume

that in a competitive equilibrium all workers would be paid the same
wage. Larger firms with stable employment histories could get

workers at a discount precisely because the employment is regarded
as more secure than work at a start-up or a new entrant into the local

market. It is, therefore, dangerous to draw any inference that lower
wage and salary profiles should be attributed only to some assertion
of monopsony power. Nor is it likely in these settings that firms will

alter their job descriptions in order to make it harder for workers to
shift firms. Changes induced for these purposes would be costly to

141 George J. Stigler, Monopoly, ECONLIB (last visited Jan. 16, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/L4BE-Q9V3] (summarizing Reuben Kessel, A Study of Competition
in the Tax-Exempt Bond Barket," 79 J. PoL. ECON. 706 (1971)). Kessel's study notes the
rapid rate of decline in underwriting commissions as a function of number of entrants:
Number of Bidders

1
2
3
6
10

Underwriting Spread

$15.74
$12.64
$12.36
$10.71
$10.23

Id. Although it does not affect the macro-trend Stigler identifies, it is important to
note that in transcribing the table from Kessel's article, Stigler uniformly added ten
dollars to each of the calculated underwriting spread values. Compare id. with Kessel,
supra, at 723.
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internal production, and it is unlikely that they could increase the

leverage over the firm, for by making the job distinctive, it not only
increases the leverage of the firm over the worker but that of the

worker over the firm, so that this is hardly a risk-free strategy. It
seems highly unlikely that any merger inquiry could isolate some

pure form of local monopsony.
In light of these different patterns in labor markets, it
becomes necessary in principle to consider a number of different
remedial strategies. The first point is whether the concern with
monopsony should trigger any antitrust inquiry of firms wholly

apart from pending merger activity. The answer to that question is
generally "no" when dealing with monopoly concerns in product

markets. Indeed, there is serious resistance to the proposition that
such reviews should take place in product markets retrospectively,
even for deals that have received approval under the Hart-ScottRodino framework. Ordinary transactions for products below that
threshold escape so much as the suggestion of an administrative
review, and the same is true for transactions involving labor. There
is just too much new input into the system to look at literally

thousands of companies whose labor forces come from thousands of
different markets. It will not happen.
Hence, the action, if it occurs, will take place in future
transactions, where size considerations will again swamp everything
else. The typical merger between two companies in the oil business
can be addressed with respect to the billions of gallons of gasoline
sold each year. The merger between rival banks can look at total

deposits, loans, or some other broad indicator. It is then possible to
attach certain conditions to a merger, including divestures in certain
submarkets where the concentration of the two firms exceeds some
permissible threshold. But, for many global or national chains there
must be thousands of small labor markets in each geographical

center at home or abroad that would require a detailed analysis to
decide whether wages per worker are off by a couple of thousand
dollars per year. If there are grounds to object on the product side, as
there will be in cases of high concentration in local markets, who
would worry about the labor side when there are already grounds to

set aside the merger? And, if there are sufficient efficiencies on the
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product side, who would want to derail a transaction because of
some modest imperfection in dozens of labor markets out of the
thousands of labor markets that are impacted? The efficiency gains
from the transaction are too large; any effort to micromanage the
labor markets will hurt shareholders and customers of the firm, as
well as workers in markets that might expand in virtue of the merger.

A related question is how the case for antitrust enforcement
varies with the types of workers who are involved. At the bottom end
of the market, hotel clerks, janitors, and waiters usually have a higher

degree of mobility because their skills are not firm, or even industry,
specific. And if they have signed various restrictive covenants,
chances are that they have received a wage premium, so as with all

rule of reason analyses the focus should be on opportunities denied
to third parties from competition, not the position of the worker. And
at higher levels, the geographical markets expand to offset some of
the supposed losses that take place because of specialization in
service markets. It may also be the case that many workers are subject

to various kinds of licensing restrictions, but here the answer comes
in two parts. First, if these are state-level limitations imposed on

national markets, as with telemedicine, we can get rid of the
restrictions without resorting to the antitrust laws. Second, if the
licenses are in place, it is hard in the abstract to decide where the
advantage lies. It may well be that the workers will find it difficult to
get other jobs, but by the same token the firm will find it more

difficult to attract replacement workers if they must find licensed
individuals to do the job. Thus, in the airline industry, pilots are
licensed by kind of craft, which means that easy substitution is not
available-which probably accounts for the strong position of
striking pilot unions.
So, what are the obvious cases to which the new approach

might yield a positive set of results? NPW provide two cases that
they think fit the bill, but both of these yield the same result with the
traditional theory. First, there is the situation in which it is observed
that firms in the same industry never hire workers away from each
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other. 142 But, the traditional approach handles that for it is certainly

sensible to infer that a common form of competition has been
suppressed by agreement when the usual rates of turnover do not
apply. It is common in antitrust law to draw those inferences. Note,
however, that the same pattern cannot emerge in product markets,
for there is no way that gasoline stations, for example, could enter
into non-poaching agreements when they have no control over who
will come to their stations. The second illustration is where a merger

of three hospitals in a given area reduces the opportunities for
nurses. 143 But again, two points matter. The first is that this level of
increase in the service market will certainly attract attention as an

ordinary three-to-two merger in the product market. And second, the
position of unionized nurses is more complex insofar as there are
elaborate rules that deal with the obligations of successor employees
that could easily give the nurses some leverage over the basic
situation. 144
Thus far, I have developed the argument solely by appealing
to common sense notions of economic theory. There are many

economic studies purporting to address this question, usually by
taking a 30,000-foot view of the matter and concluding, without
much differentiation, that these substantial pockets of monopoly
power can persist for long periods of time. 145 But in this regard, it is
far more instructive to disaggregate the various groups of workers
within a single classification. Any apparent persistence at this level
is a puzzle given that there are in general no formal barriers to entry,
such that the existence of these supranormal profits could not be a
state secret, which makes it highly doubtful that these barriers work

142 See, e.g., Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 15, at 597-98.
143 See id. at 591-95.

144 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1964) (holding that
employer decisions to contract out the work of employees in an existing bargaining
unit is subject to collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act).
145 See, e.g., Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 3; Efraim Benmelech et

al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees:

How

Does Employer Concentration Affect

Wages? 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24307, 2018).
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in all, or even most, markets. It is much more plausible for these
theories to work in markets that do have barriers to entry, of which

hospitals are one, given that new entry into a market requires a
certificate of convenience and necessity (CON) in most states. 146
Fortunately, there is a recent econometric study by Elena Prager

and Matt Schmitt that does an extensive study of market
concentration and mergers in hospital markets without once
mentioning the role that certificates of need might play in the
analysis.147 In their study of mergers that take place in hospital
markets, the firms are large enough to matter and the levels of
concentration in local market often quite high. One great virtue of
their study is that it disaggregates employees into three classes:
unskilled workers at low level jobs with little specific capital; skilled
nonmedical workers such as HR specialists that do not have unique
medical skills; and the skilled high-level professionals like nurses or

pharmacists who do have specific skills and, in many cases, limited
mobility. 148 As they summarize their findings:

For unskilled workers, we do not find evidence of
differences in wage growth post-merger, irrespective of the
change in employer concentration induced by the merger.

146 See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CON - Certificate of Need State Laws

(Dec. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3MLC-WRTR?type=image]. Here is the purported
theory:
The basic assumption underlying CON regulation is that excess health care
facility capacity results in health care price inflation. Price inflation can
occur when a hospital cannot fill its beds and fixed costs must be met
through higher charges for the beds that are used. Larger institutions
generally have larger costs, so hospitals and other health facilities may raise
prices in order to pay for new, underused medical services or empty beds.
Id. Whatever this is, it does not sound like monopsony behavior, where excessive
capacity is a simple waste. But a barrier to entry will raise price, given that existing
firms do not have to create excessive capacity.
147

Elana Prager & Matt Schmitt Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from

Hospitals, 111 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (2021). Posner comments briefly on the study in his
New York Times editorial, You Deserve a Bigger Paycheck, supra note 89, without
analyzing their findings.
148 Prager & Schmitt, supra note 147, at 398.
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For the two categories of skilled workers, we find evidence
of reduced wage growth, but only in cases where the

concentration increase induced by the merger is large. 149
Their results square with the general theory, as there is little

evidence of any monopsony power with low wage workers, some in
the second, and more in the third, but only in those cases where the
firms in the local market are highly concentrated - and, I should add,
where the CON limits the prospect of new entry. They also find,
consistent with general theory, that if nurses are members of

professional unions, as is often the case, their market power can stem
the wage losses associated with any merger.150

At no point do Prager and Schmitt seek to work through the
administrative and legal implications of applying this general
framework to a particular merger case, where it is virtually certain
that litigants on all sides of the transactions are likely to point to some

distinctive feature that purports to explain why this case is more (or
less) prone to wage reduction than the average case in the field. And
in a sense, it is all unnecessary. Once it is clear that there is high
concentration in the labor market, it follows that there is also high

concentration in the product and service market, as noted, at which
point the marginal benefit of conducting the labor-side analysis is
minimal, given that there is an evident need to address the product
side of the market, yielding a highly correlated result. Indeed, the
entire situation would be much improved by the repeal of the CON

statutes, which block new entry in both product and labor markets.
CONCLUSION

There are a set of rich ironies in addressing the question of
whether, and if so how, the antitrust laws should apply to employers.
The first of these is historical. The early applications of the antitrust

149 Id.
150

Id.

at 419-21.
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laws targeted the efforts of unions, especially through secondary
boycotts, to use economic pressure in order to secure their economic
objectives. But, the legal response was not to condemn these as illegal

activities. Instead, it took the position that unions could engage in a
collective refusal to deal with an employer, even if they could not use
various tactics that went beyond their refusal to deal, most notably

the secondary boycott and the strategic withdrawal of services at
critical times during the life of the contract. The New Deal response

was not to attack that use of monopoly power but to solidify it by
adding protections in the form of an exclusive right to represent
workers that required employers to negotiate in good faith with the
union as their exclusive representative if selected by a majority of the
workers.

The progressive economists who prize competition should join
with classical liberals in seeking to remove the legal underpinnings

of union monopoly power. Instead, they sidestep that conclusion and
insist that the antitrust laws should turn their attention to employers
and their actions that limit workers choices. There is much merit in

the first part of that program that applies existing law to various
covenants not-to-compete in labor markets. It is sound, but, in its
basic outline, it is similar to the traditional position that it is relatively

easy to apply antitrust laws to explicit contractual provisions.
It is, however, a very different question as to whether the
antitrust law can sensibly be applied to claims, especially in the

context of mergers, that employers wield some monopsony power
that should be countered by the government in the course of its

review. There are, in principle, reasons to doubt that these pockets of
power will escape the attention of new entrants who can bid up the
wages of workers. But even if the forces of new entry are halting,
there is little reason to think that this source of power applies to low
level workers whose broad but limited skill sets allow them to shift

jobs across different industrial categories. And for those jobs that do
have some special licensing requirements, it is just not clear who

benefits from the restriction: is it the workers, who are not at risk
from new entry by unlicensed competitors, or is it firms that know

these workers must sacrifice real income if they do not continue to
use their licensed skills? But in the face of all this uncertainty, any
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firm that has high levels of monopsony in labor markets will likely

have high levels of monopoly profits in product and service markets.
The ability to deal with the product market is far easier, which means

that there is no strong case for seeking to include in merger
evaluations a detailed examination of the multiple labor markets in
which many national and global firms operate.

So, the message again is to keep it simple and go after the lowhanging fruit. And in so doing, we reject the explicit premise of
Posner's book How Antitrust Failed Workers. For the most part,
antitrust law does not touch workers' lives, which are heavily

influenced by direct forms of regulation whose consequences are
often too clear. It is just not the case that some novel expansion of the
antitrust laws would help the position of workers. On the strength of
the current evidence, we should not even attempt any major changes

in antitrust practice. In the end, therefore, the standard rule that
ignores labor markets in antitrust is the best result in a second-best
world.
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